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test(e2e): add aimock adversarial containment and authorization evals - #817
Adds model-free adversarial evals, labeled adversarial-eval, to the agent-runtime E2E lane. Each eval scripts a model reacting to untrusted repository or tool content, then checks the system boundaries with independent evidence. The evals do not measure model judgment or prompt-injection resistance.
Runtime containment (test/e2e/aimock_runtime_eval_test.go): runs the real Codex, Claude, Copilot, and OpenCode CLIs. It covers containment of SCM and provider-proxy credentials, governed extraction during Session continuation, and read-only mutation driven by repository content (EVAL_INJECTION.md, now seeded by fakeforge), with separate delivery and publication evidence. Codex carries an explicit knownDefect baseline: under read intent, exec_command can still change the workspace, and ReadOnlyWorkspaceModified stops publication. That is delivery containment, not write prevention, and the baseline fails once the gap is fixed.
Authorization (test/e2e/aimock_authorization_eval_test.go): checks the deployed broker allowlist, delegation namespace and agent restrictions, and child transaction-scope containment on an external harness-v2 runtimeRef. It also checks native publication authority. Every denial has a permitted same-tool control.
Fixtures:
test/fixtures/aimockcapture: a bounded proxy in front of aimock that captures full request bodies, including those over aimock's 64 KiB journal cap. It stores no headers. Limits are 4 MiB per request, 64 MiB total, and 4096 entries; past them it rejects requests instead of dropping evidence. Exports stream with one concurrent reader. The E2E reader has a bounded deadline and never echoes captured content in errors.
test/fixtures/aimockauthority: an ephemeral, synthetic signing, JWKS, and TTS authority. It records receipts but never tokens or keys.
cmd/orka-harness-v2-e2e-fixture: an opt-in broker-prompt observer plus a bounded aimock loop against the controller's public MCP broker (ORKA_E2E_CAPTURE_BROKER_PROMPT). Default behavior is unchanged.
Suite wiring: builds and loads both fixture images, runs aimock behind the capture sidecar, and seeds a per-run synthetic provider-auth-proxy canary before the controller deploys.
Docs: website/docs/development/testing.md documents the eval design, evidence rules, and how to run them.
All credentials are synthetic and local to the cluster. Built-in runtimes are not claimed to support TxTokens, and external fixtures are not claimed to exercise native CLI workspace isolation.
Testing
go test ./test/fixtures/aimockcapture/... ./test/fixtures/aimockauthority/... ./test/fixtures/fakeforge/... ./cmd/orka-harness-v2-e2e-fixture/...
go test -tags=e2e ./test/e2e -run '^Test(AimockEval|RuntimeEval|AuthorizationEval)' -count=1: 20 cluster-free helper and contract tests
go vet -tags=e2e and golangci-lint run --new-from-rev=origin/main --build-tags=e2e on the changed packages
Cluster lane: E2E_GINKGO_LABEL_FILTER=adversarial-eval E2E_ACP_IDLE_POOL_TTL=15m make test-e2e (the agent-runtime E2E matrix job runs these specs)
Summary by CodeRabbit
Tests
Expanded end-to-end evaluations of authorization boundaries, delegated access, broker interactions, and credential containment.
Added checks for permitted and denied actions, sensitive-data exposure, and repository changes and publication across supported runtimes.
Added coverage for model-request capture, broker-mediated interactions, and confirming that denied actions produce no unauthorized effects.
Added validation for adversarial evaluation results and sensitive-data handling.
Documentation
Expanded the testing guide with evaluation coverage, setup requirements, limitations, and commands for running the tests.
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📒 Files selected for processing: 4
test/e2e/aimock_authorization_eval_test.go
test/e2e/aimock_eval_helpers_test.go
test/e2e/aimock_eval_helpers_unit_test.go
test/e2e/mock_llm_test.go
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📝 Walkthrough
The pull request adds bounded model-request capture and synthetic authority fixtures for E2E testing. It adds runtime and authorization evaluations, a broker prompt observer with an optional model loop, and documentation for the test scenarios and their stated limits.
Changes: Adversarial E2E evaluations
Layer / File(s)
Summary
Capture proxy and request evidence test/fixtures/aimockcapture/*, test/e2e/mock_llm_test.go, test/e2e/aimock_eval_helpers*
A bounded proxy captures model request bodies and response lifecycle metadata. The E2E harness deploys it beside aimock. Helpers validate capture continuity, request receipts, tool results, and credential canaries.
A test fixture issues signed tokens and validates exchanges against scope, namespace, and operation constraints. It records exchange receipts and effects for evaluation checks.
Runtime credential and read-only evaluations test/e2e/aimock_runtime_eval*, test/e2e/testdata/aimock/runtime_adversarial_eval.json, test/fixtures/fakeforge/*, test/e2e/e2e_suite_test.go
The suite tests extraction, publication, session continuation, and repository-origin write attempts across Codex, Claude, Copilot, and OpenCode. It checks model requests, runtime outcomes, credentials, and forge state.
Broker prompt observer and model loop cmd/orka-harness-v2-e2e-fixture/*
The harness records accepted-prompt metadata behind an authenticated observer. Its optional model loop sends authorized tool schemas to a model proxy and submits selected calls to the public broker.
Authorization evaluations and test guidance test/e2e/aimock_authorization_eval_test.go, test/e2e/testdata/aimock/authorization_adversarial_eval.json, website/docs/development/testing.md
The suite tests broker allowlists, delegation restrictions, child transaction scopes, and publication credentials. The documentation describes the evaluation checks, fixtures, commands, and stated limitations.
sequenceDiagram
participant AuthorizationEval
participant TaskRuntime
participant PublicBroker
participant MockAuthority
AuthorizationEval->>TaskRuntime: Start task with transaction-token authority
TaskRuntime->>PublicBroker: Submit delegation or tool call
PublicBroker->>MockAuthority: Exchange token and validate requested scope
MockAuthority->>PublicBroker: Return exchange result
PublicBroker->>TaskRuntime: Return tool result or refusal
TaskRuntime->>AuthorizationEval: Expose task outcome and evaluation receipts
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Merge Risk:🔵 Low · up to 83674
Malformed tool arguments can stop an adversarial authorization eval before the broker evaluates the call. This is a bounded fixture limitation, but it should be fixed or explicitly accepted before relying on that scenario.
Security architecture risk:🔵 Low · up to 83674
The changes are primarily confined to testing and do not establish an expansion of production permissions. Sensitive test data and temporary trust settings have explicit containment controls, but deployment and recovery behavior remain only partly verified.
Retained concerns
No architecture-level concerns identified.
Security review details
Security Blast Radius
inferred — The introduced sensitive-data and authority surface is centered on the E2E cluster: retained inference bodies, synthetic tokens, temporary controller trust, and synthetic repository publication. Raw parent issuance and exchanged-token observation are restricted by the configured loopback listener; that boundary depends on keeping the test deployment configuration intact.
Security Findings and Attack Paths
observed — The scripted attack path starts with lower-trust tool or repository content and requests forbidden tool invocation, cross-namespace delegation, child-scope expansion, or publication without authority. Denials are paired with permitted controls and independent no-effect checks. The canonical security input contains no retained findings; these test scenarios do not themselves demonstrate a vulnerability.
Trust Boundaries and Controls
observed — The broker checks allowed descriptors, active prompt authority, authenticated pool identity, execution fences, frozen policy, and operation capability before execution. The new observer records only accepted backend prompts and requires its bearer credential to initiate evaluation calls. This narrows the allowlist proof gap but does not substitute for deployed execution evidence.
observed — Authorization evaluations check child-token Secret ownership against the child Task UID and verify absence of attempted publication, not merely unchanged branches. Delegation also invokes workspace credential preflight before attaching the child workspace. The downstream push-enforcement implementation remains outside the completed inspection.
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
observed — Malformed tool arguments can fail the observer's request construction before reaching the broker. This is a coverage limitation, not an observed authorization bypass: the evaluation requires a completed loop, successful bracketing controls, and an actual HTTP rejection receipt for the forbidden invocation.
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The title clearly and concisely identifies the main changes: E2E aimock adversarial containment and authorization evaluations.
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Actionable comments posted: 1
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @cmd/orka-harness-v2-e2e-fixture/broker_loop.go:
- Around line 208-225: Normalize model-supplied arguments before constructing
the MCPBrokerCallRequest in the broker loop: use an empty JSON object for blank
input and encode invalid JSON arguments as a JSON string. Set the normalized
value on MCPToolCall.Arguments so CanonicalRequestDigest and json.Marshal
succeed and the broker receives the call for policy validation.
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captureJournal() is deadline-bounded, but every eval then calls the legacy journal() helper, whose kubectl exec/Node fetch has neither a context nor a fetch timeout. If the aimock journal endpoint or stdout pipe stalls, Eventually cannot interrupt this call and the entire serial E2E lane can hang indefinitely. Pass the same bounded context through a context-aware journal reader (including CommandContext/WaitDelay and an abort timeout) before correlating receipts.
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🔵 Needs a closer look
It spans security-sensitive authorization, credential containment, networking, and extensive cluster orchestration that warrants final human validation.
CodeQL resolved the io.Writer Write call to every Write implementation in
the module, including HTTP response wrappers, and reported request-derived
hash inputs as reflected XSS. The writer is always a SHA-256 hash.
Signed-off-by: Sertac Ozercan <sozercan@gmail.com>
The denied-call forge check compared receipts against "push" and
"create-pull", which fakeforge never records, so a rejected push could pass
the eval. Compare against fakeforge.SurfaceGitPush; the API mutation check
already covers pull-request creation.
Eval capture reads were bounded, but the aimock journal read that follows them
was not. Bound the journal subprocess and its pod-local reader the same way and
cover a stalled journal read.
Signed-off-by: Sertac Ozercan <sozercan@gmail.com>
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Summary
Adds model-free adversarial evals, labeled
adversarial-eval, to theagent-runtimeE2E lane. Each eval scripts a model reacting to untrusted repository or tool content, then checks the system boundaries with independent evidence. The evals do not measure model judgment or prompt-injection resistance.test/e2e/aimock_runtime_eval_test.go): runs the real Codex, Claude, Copilot, and OpenCode CLIs. It covers containment of SCM and provider-proxy credentials, governed extraction during Session continuation, and read-only mutation driven by repository content (EVAL_INJECTION.md, now seeded by fakeforge), with separate delivery and publication evidence. Codex carries an explicitknownDefectbaseline: under read intent,exec_commandcan still change the workspace, andReadOnlyWorkspaceModifiedstops publication. That is delivery containment, not write prevention, and the baseline fails once the gap is fixed.test/e2e/aimock_authorization_eval_test.go): checks the deployed broker allowlist, delegation namespace and agent restrictions, and child transaction-scope containment on an external harness-v2runtimeRef. It also checks native publication authority. Every denial has a permitted same-tool control.test/fixtures/aimockcapture: a bounded proxy in front of aimock that captures full request bodies, including those over aimock's 64 KiB journal cap. It stores no headers. Limits are 4 MiB per request, 64 MiB total, and 4096 entries; past them it rejects requests instead of dropping evidence. Exports stream with one concurrent reader. The E2E reader has a bounded deadline and never echoes captured content in errors.test/fixtures/aimockauthority: an ephemeral, synthetic signing, JWKS, and TTS authority. It records receipts but never tokens or keys.cmd/orka-harness-v2-e2e-fixture: an opt-in broker-prompt observer plus a bounded aimock loop against the controller's public MCP broker (ORKA_E2E_CAPTURE_BROKER_PROMPT). Default behavior is unchanged.provider-auth-proxycanary before the controller deploys.website/docs/development/testing.mddocuments the eval design, evidence rules, and how to run them.All credentials are synthetic and local to the cluster. Built-in runtimes are not claimed to support TxTokens, and external fixtures are not claimed to exercise native CLI workspace isolation.
Testing
go test ./test/fixtures/aimockcapture/... ./test/fixtures/aimockauthority/... ./test/fixtures/fakeforge/... ./cmd/orka-harness-v2-e2e-fixture/...go test -tags=e2e ./test/e2e -run '^Test(AimockEval|RuntimeEval|AuthorizationEval)' -count=1: 20 cluster-free helper and contract testsgo vet -tags=e2eandgolangci-lint run --new-from-rev=origin/main --build-tags=e2eon the changed packagesE2E_GINKGO_LABEL_FILTER=adversarial-eval E2E_ACP_IDLE_POOL_TTL=15m make test-e2e(theagent-runtimeE2E matrix job runs these specs)Summary by CodeRabbit
Tests
Documentation